Security Council announces plan to visit Middle East
As the Republic of Slovenia assumes the presidency of the United Nations Security Council for the final month of 2025, the 15-member body is scheduled to conduct landmark visits to both Lebanon and Syria from December 3–7.
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Sphinx News: Ahmed Ali
In this last month of 2025, the United Nations Security Council is scheduled to make its first combined mission to the Middle East in nearly 6 years.
With the Council’s last joint mission to the region occurring in June 2019, where they visited Iraq and Kuwait, this month they are scheduled to travel to Syria and Lebanon.
The trip will be held from December 3rd to December 7th, coordinated under the Security Council’s President for the month, Ambassador Samuel Zbogar, Permanent Representative of Slovenia to the United Nations. As Slovenia presides over the Council and hosts this monumental delegation, Ambassador Zbogar assures that all 15 members of the Council will be present.
The bilateral meetings and conferences will see representatives of member states within the Security Council meet with Syrian and Lebanese officials. While the list of Syrian and Lebanese officials remains enclosed from the public, Zbogar contends that the conversations will seek to facilitate dialogue between the United Nations and both Middle Eastern states on, “key point of references agreed upon buy the Council.”
The decision to embark on this joint trip, in what has become an increasingly difficult and precarious time for the region, “was not easy,” Zbogar adds. Nonetheless, Zbogar says, “We (Slovenia) are happy that we successfully convinced the Council and its 14 members that we go in this trip.”
The aim of the trip for the Council, Zbogar admits, “is to get a better glimpse of what teh situation is in each state, and underscore our unwavering message of support.”
With both Lebanon and Syria having pertinent and nuance issues relative to their individual internal politics and their unique geopolitical positions, the conversations and subject matter for each country will undoubtedly be different.
With Syria, Zbogar exclaims that Syria’s brutal 14 year long civil war under the Asaad regime produced cataclysmic repercussions for the state. While there has been a new administration largely present since December of 2024, the Council’s initiative there will be to foster inclusivity.
Acknowledging that Syrian’s felt largely unaccounted for and “ignored by the Council” during their civil war, the meetings in Damascus will seek to rekindle that, “lack of trust with the UN and Syria relationship.” The conversations with Syria, according to Zbogar, will also seek to tackle, “the fight against terrorism, and other elements,” likely to be in relation to the state’s ongoing humanitarian situation and economic instability.
Just in November 19th of 2025, UN Deputy Special Envoy for Syria Najat Rochdi told the Security Council, “the situation in Syria is extremely serious.” She added that the UN humanitarian office (OCHA) revealed there are over 16 million Syrian’s in need of aid, with hundreds of thousands more displaced. While Rochdi welcomed the removal of UN sanctions against President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Interior Minister Anas Khattab, she highlighted the need to further remove UN targeted sanctions on third parties doing business with Syria. The targeted sanctions are, “key impediments to enabling reconstruction and reviving the devastated Syrian economy.”
A long with the internal instability and economic infractures following the political transition out of the Asaad regime, Rochdi highlights that key to Syria’s detriment has been the ongoing Israeli military incursion and occupation of the Golan heights. She highlighted that Israel has been, “in grave violation of Syria’s sovereignty and of international law.”
With these likely being points of reference and expected dialogue between representatives of Syria and representatives of the Security Council, Zgobar makes clear that the treatment of Syrian ethnic minorities will not be an immediate point for teh Council to interject. The situation of ethnic minorities within Syrian territory (notably the Kurds, Alawites, and Druze), must be a situation “Syria needs to decide.” He adds that the, “politics process within must be Syrian led and Syria owned….and we as Slovenia would not advise that somebody from outside advise Syria on what to do.” Aforementioned, Zgobar says, “we will encourage when we are in Syria to be inclusive and to find solutions for all grievances, but we should not be the ones to advise Syria on the path to take.”
On Lebanon, Zgobar reveals that there will be “different challenges” to tackle. Much of the conversation in Lebanon will deal with the need for abidance of the Israeli Lebanon ceasefire of 2024, which has been fragile and repeatedly violate. A key point of reference for the Council within the framework of the agreed ceasefire will be the, “disarmament of Hezbollah.” The message will therefore be one of, “support for the leadership of Lebanon…. and encouragement to continue.”
Zgboar additionally reveals that the Security Council intends to visit UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) forces on the ground. The mandate and peacekeeping responsibilities of UNIFIL has of course been repeatedly infringed, particularly in the last several months. October and November of 2025 have seen UNIFIL peacekeeping forces impeded and even hit, particularly by Israeli military forces. It will be important than for the Council to, as Zgobar says, “get perspective of how the situation on the ground” looks, and see the “blue line (a United Nations created demarcated line in 2000, adopted by Security Council Resolution 425 in 1978 establishing UNIFIL, and representative of where Israeli forces must fully withdraw from).”


